Is it Possible for Citizens to Engage in Dialog with the Ministry of the Environment as it Promotes the Recycling of Soil Contaminated by Radioactivity

By Yumiko Fuseya, NPO Shinjuku Yoyogi Citizen Monitoring Center, Citizens Against Dissemination of Radioactivity

What is the recycling of removed soil?

I would like first to introduce myself. I am Fuseya Yumiko from the Shinjuku Yoyogi Citizen Monitoring Center. It has now been 35 years since I became involved in citizens’ activities to measure radioactivity in the wake of the Chernobyl nuclear accident.

In December 2022, the Ministry of the Environment (MoE) announced that it would transport the so-called “removed soil” stored at Fukushima Prefecture’s Intermediate Storage Facility into Shinjuku Gyoen Gardens and construct flower beds in a “demonstration project” to investigate the effects of radioactivity. Since that time, I have become deeply involved in the issue of the “recycling of removed soil.”

The term “removed soil” does not mean soil from which radioactivity has been removed. According to the document “Briefing on the Demonstration Project to be Conducted by the Ministry of the Environment at Shinjuku Gyoen Gardens,”[1] distributed at a residents’ briefing,  “The removed soil is topsoil removed and retrieved from gardens and farmland by decontamination work.” There is no mention of even the “r” of radioactivity in the explanation, but doesn’t this refer to dangerous soil contaminated with radioactivity? What will they demonstrate with the radioactively contaminated soil? According to the above handout, they will “confirm the safety of the recycling (of the removed soil).” Wasn’t this done by stripping the soil away from where citizens live because it was dangerous?

In the various explanations, it was said that it would be safe because the contaminated soil would be covered with uncontaminated soil and because it would not reach 1mSv (millisievert) per year, but in the end, neither the residents of Shinjuku Ward nor the citizens of Tokorozawa, another candidate site for the demonstration project, were convinced and continued to protest. These demonstration projects have therefore not been implemented yet.

Currently, MoE has put these demonstration projects on hold and is in the final stages of a move toward serious implementation (recycling of the removed soil in public works projects nationwide) from 2025. On September 10, the IAEA released its “Final Report”[2] (described below), and immediately after that, the Strategic Study Group on the Development of Technology for Volume Reduction and Recycling of Removed Soil from Intermediate Storage and four working groups under this Strategic Study Group all began to move in unison to compile a wide range of measures and guidelines that they had been considering for some time. It is expected that a draft ministerial ordinance will be prepared by the end of this fiscal year, and that a cabinet decision will be made after public comments have been solicited. Preparations for the recycling of removed soil (soil contaminated by radioactivity) have been steadily progressing, but what is the problem? The difficult problem faced is the question of whether a dialogue can be established between those of us who are opposed to the recycling of removed soil and MoE.

The problem of double standards

One of the problems with the recycling of removed soil is that it is a double standard. (I will explain everything below in terms of radioactive cesium concentration.)　

Despite the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Act[3] stating that only waste of 100 Bq/kg (becquerels/kilogram) or less can be recycled, “removed soil” of up to 8,000 Bq/kg can be recycled, and this is a double standard.

So, how does MoE explain this double standard? I will need to explain about “waste.” MoE refers to soil contaminated with radiation as a “valuable resource,” not as waste. The document “Differences Between the 100 Bq/kg and 8,000 Bq/kg Standards,”[4] issued by the MoE’s Waste and Recycling Division explains that “Briefly, 100 Bq/kg is the standard for safe recycling of waste, while 8,000 Bq/kg is the standard for safe disposal of waste.” If you read it further, it goes on to say that “the standard for wastes of 8,000 Bq/kg or less assumes general processing methods (sorting, incineration, or landfill disposal) and is a standard for safe disposal.” It then gives detailed explanations of how these wastes can be disposed of “more safely by incineration, landfill disposal, etc. using conventional methods employed thus far.” If you read this explanation, who would think that “recycling” is included in “safe disposal”? This is one of the “deceitful techniques” that MoE uses. Furthermore, MoE does not mention recycling in this document, but on its website it lists the achievements thus far of recycling of waste from “Contaminated Waste Countermeasure Areas (areas that were designated as evacuation zones)” without revealing data on the concentration of radioactivity.[5]

Is there an explanation that will resolve this contradiction? The Association Against the Spread of Radioactivity sent a letter to MoE asking the question. “Do the general processing methods (sorting, incineration, landfill disposal, etc.) for waste up to 8,000 Bq/kg include reuse or recycling? If so, why are these not specified?” MoE’s response was as follows.

“The explanation referred to in your question was written with incineration and landfill disposal in mind, but it does not exclude the processing of waste for recycling.”

While on the one hand they say the wastes can be safely reused and on the other that they can be safely disposed of, as if it were not a double standard, but do not say that “the recycling of wastes of 8,000 Bq/kg or less are not excluded (or are even promoted)” unless asked. However, if recycling is not excluded, the wastes will be reused or recycled whether it is 100 or 8,000, making no difference, which is clearly a double standard. This technique is deliberately used to avoid answering the question “Why is recycling not specified?”

Contaminated soil mound in the intermediate storage facility in the process of leveling in December 2022 (right foreground)

This deceitful technique can be found everywhere. For example, to the question, “Could you explain why the IAEA meeting of experts is closed to the public?” The answer was, “A summary report is available on the MoE website.” Some might think, “Oh, I see. You can see it on the website.” However, we should note here that they ignore the question, “Why is it closed?” Doesn’t doing things in this way make it impossible to build a relationship of trust that is the premise for dialogue

The Problem of Interpretation of the Law

Another problem that has been raised about the “recycling of removed soil” is the interpretation of the wording of the law. Specifically, MoE claims that “disposal” includes “recycling” even though Article 41 [6] of the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Materials Contaminated by Radiation includes “disposal” but not “recycling.” Since the term “disposal” has not included “recycling” in any law up until now,[7] how come it is suddenly “interpreted to include recycling”? MoE’s response to the question “Isn’t this inconsistent with the current legal framework?” is as follows.

“Recycling of removed soil under the Act on Special Measures falls under “disposal,” as prescribed in Article 41, Paragraph 1 of the Act, and the Basic Policy[8] approved by the Cabinet on November 11, 2023 also mentions recycling of removed soil.”

In answer to the question “How is it we say that A includes B?” the response says nothing more than B is included in A.

Furthermore, the abovementioned Basic Policy approved by the Cabinet only states that “recycling, etc. needs to be considered,” but does not say that “recycling” is included in “disposal.”

Exposure Risk Deception

There are two additional problems.

One is the difficulty of understanding the radiation risks, and the second is whether or not this contributes to the reconstruction of Fukushima. The difficulty of understanding radiation risks has a very complicated background that is completely different from other chemical substances. The terminology, such as Bq, Sv, air dose, and effective dose, is hard to understand. Some of these terms have been created unilaterally by experts who wish to promote nuclear power, while others have different definitions and interpretations even among experts. The fact that radiation is invisible, tasteless, and that its effects cannot be immediately ascertained unless the exposure is very serious also makes this a difficult problem to grasp.

The explanation that exposure to 1 mSv per year is safe is often presented conspicuously here and there, but if we say that food with up to 1mSv, air with up to 1mSv, and soil with up to 1mSv of contamination is safe, is that alright? In the first place, 1mSv is a standard established by the International Commission on Radiological Protection (ICRP), which states that five out of 100,000 people will die of cancer after a single exposure.[9] This is a far cry from Japan’s standard for chemical substances in tap water, which states that 1 out of 100,000 people will have a health risk (not death) if they consume the water over their lifetime. 1 mSv is not a safe standard.

In the case of the “recycling of removed soil,” even if the explanation that “if 50 cm of uncontaminated soil is placed over contaminated soil, the radiation shielding rate is 99.8%,” and that “the standard of 1mSv per year is met,” does not convince the public, it would be difficult for citizens to come up with grounds for denying it.

The standard for “recycling of removed soil” is 8,000Bq/kg or less, which is the same as the waste disposal standard. Despite the explanation that “it is safe because the contaminated soil is covered over,” the actual way this is handled is quite sloppy. Surprisingly, at a MoE joint meeting held on September 17, it was revealed that the additional radiation exposure for restoration workers would be less than 1mSv per year even if the covering soil is blown away and contaminated soil is exposed due to a disaster (Figure 1)[10]. Here, too, is another deceitful technique. The restoration workers are, would you believe, treated in the same way as if they were working on an iron plate that has been placed on the ground, and the radiation effects are calculated using a shielding factor of 0.6.

On the page describing the calculation results, even though there is a shielding factor, there is no premise stating that the work is carried out in the same way as if it were on an iron plate. Why is the restoration work on disaster-damaged soil the same as that carried out on an iron plate?

Also, shouldn’t internal exposure to cesium balls[11], recently taken up as an important research issue, be taken into account? Furthermore, workers who handle contaminated soil at close range are treated as if they were the general public[12], so is assumed that protective measures such as masks are not taken? Even though this project, with its many unknowns is about to get underway, isn’t there too little consideration for or use of the precautionary principle to protect workers from exposure risk? In addition to the difficulty of understanding the risks posed by radiation, if calculation methods are deliberately concealed, as in this case, it is inevitable that citizens will be confused and kept in the dark, and one cannot help but think that this is what the government and MoE seem to be aiming at. This is a problem that exists before dialogue can begin.

Does this really contribute to the reconstruction of Fukushima?

Another problem is the logic that reducing the amount of contaminated soil in intermediate storage facilities contributes to the reconstruction of Fukushima.

At the explanatory meeting for residents, which I mentioned earlier, the first thing that happened was that the video “Fukushima, 10 years passed; Fukushima, to the next stage”[13] was shown. In the video, the question was asked. “(Regarding the issue of removed soil) is this just a problem of Fukushima alone?” and then the audience was called upon to “Please think together from now on.” It makes it sound as if recycling removed soil is an issue for the entire Japanese nation. But how many people in Fukushima really wish to see removed soil used nationwide? Do they think it will lead to reconstruction? I have never heard anyone say this.

In addition, the government and MoE are using overwhelming amounts of material and financial resources that cannot be compared with what citizens can do to promote the acceptance of the recycling of removed soil, using corporations and others for “national public awareness activities.” The working group is also considering that from now on targeting particularly high school and university students will be effective.[14] But what we should be thinking about is not how to use radioactive soil but what kind of reconstruction will truly benefit Fukushima, and ultimately Japan.

IAEA Final Report

Finally, I should mention the Final Report issued by the IAEA on September 10.

This report summarizes the outcomes of three expert meetings which MoE requested the IAEA hold on “the volume reduction and recycling of removed soil.” In the press release, it was announced that Japan’s currently planned efforts are consistent with IAEA safety standards. However, looking at the Executive Summary[15] translated by MoE, there is no specific content that explains in what respect the safety standards are consistent. The only specific point given is that the additional effective dose of 1mSv/year is an approach consistent with IAEA safety standards, but this is nothing more than simply stating that the standards are consistent.

Instead, there are many abstract and vague expressions such as “If this can be realized safely, the volume of wastes can be reduced,” and “The demonstration project… indicates the potential for safe and advantageous use,” and, in their conclusion, “We encourage and commend the Ministry of the Environment’s continued efforts,” and “Japan continues to make significant progress towards long-term management of removed soil and waste.” It seems that the IAEA wrote this report with little understanding of the actual methods intended to be used to recycle waste. (Did they hear about things like work being done by laying down an iron plate?)

Unfortunately, I have to say that dialogue with MoE will be quite difficult, but we have the right to refuse exposure to artificial and unnecessary radiation. Further, if we don’t shift the rudder in the direction of ending the spread of radioactive waste into the global environment, we will feel very sorry to the next generation for what we have done.

With so many problems that need to be dealt with, such as the disposal of high-level radioactive waste and spent nuclear fuel, and the lack of standards for radioactive materials in the Basic Environment Act, how can we overcome the current situation where dialogue between ministries and citizens is so difficult and relations of trust cannot be built? This is the biggest problem.

I believe that the only way to solve this problem is for conscientious experts and citizens to continue to work together by pooling their wisdom and strengths.

Notes

1. Briefing on the Demonstration Project to be Conducted by the Ministry of the Environment at Shinjuku Gyoen Gardens, December 21, 2022　　josen.env.go.jp/chukanchozou/facility/recycling/project_kengai/pdf/info_session_221221.pdf (Japanese)
2. IAEA Final Report, kankyosaisei.env.go.jp/next/international/pdf/final-report_en.pdf
3. Act on the Regulation of Nuclear Source Material, Nuclear Fuel Material and Reactors, www.nra.go.jp/data/000067232.pdf (English)
4. Differences Between the 100 Bq/kg and 8,000 Bq/kg Standards,　www.env.go.jp/content/900481585.pdf (Japanese)
5. Progress in the Processing of Waste in the Countermeasure Area under the Direct Control of the National Government, josen.env.go.jp/plaza/info/data/pdf/data_2409_07.pdf
6. Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged by the Nuclear Power Plant Accident Associated with the Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake on March 11, 2011, Article 41,　laws.e-gov.go.jp/law/423AC1000000110 (Japanese)
7. Example: Article 1 of the Act on Waste Management and Public Cleansing “The purpose of this Act is to conserve the living environment and enhance public health by controlling the discharge of waste and carrying out waste management such as proper sorting, storage, collection, transport, recycling, disposal, etc. of waste, and to keep the living environment clean,” thereby describing recycling and disposal as separate concepts.　www.japaneselawtranslation.go.jp/ja/laws/view/4529 (English and Japanese)
8. Basic Policy of the Act on Special Measures Concerning the Handling of Environmental Pollution by Radioactive Materials Discharged by the Nuclear Power Plant Accident Associated with the Off the Pacific Coast of Tohoku Earthquake on March 11, 2011, p.7, Section 5, www.env.go.jp/press/files/jp/18581.pdf (Japanese)
9. Japanese translation of ICRP Standards: Recommendations of the International Commission on Radiological Protection for 2007, p. 21 and Annex A, p.152
10. Assessment calculation: Points Regarding the Standard for Recycling and Utilization of Removed Soil (draft) p. 10,　josen.env.go.jp/chukanchozou/facility/effort/investigative_commission/pdf/joint_meeting_wg_240917_04.pdf?0925 (Japanese)
11. Cesium balls: Water-insoluble fine particles (equivalent to PM 2.5) containing extremely high concentrations of cesium. It has been pointed out that cesium balls may be adsorbed into and be present in the lungs for long periods of time.
12. Approach to Radiological Protection in the Recycling and Final Disposal of Removed Soil, etc., p.3,　josen.env.go.jp/chukanchozou/facility/effort/investigative_commission/pdf/joint_meeting_wg_240917_03.pdf (Japanese)
13. Fukushima, 10 years passed; Fukushima, to the next stage, Ministry of the Environment YouTube channel, youtu.be/-3Yo0PgJyp8?si=UhEPkdMKGRCHEHpx (English, 1hr 34 mins)
14. Future Issues Related to Building a National Understanding, etc., p.2　josen.env.go.jp/chukanchozou/facility/effort/investigative_commission/pdf/proceedings_241003_02_04.pdf (Japanese)
15. Ministry of the Environment outline translation of IAEA Experts’ Meeting Final Report Executive Summary on Recycling and Use of Removed Soil, etc.　kankyosaisei.env.go.jp/next/international/pdf/final-report_executive-summary_jp-provisional.pdf (Japanese) The full English IAEA report can be seen at the link shown in note 2.

Please sign the online petition Oppose “reuse” of contaminated soil that spreads radioactivity! chng.it/xYB77jVvLN (Japanese and English)